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Abstract: 
 
Objectives: Age-related performance decrements have been linked to inferior strategic choices. 
Strategy selection models argue that accurate task representations are necessary for choosing 
appropriate strategies. But no studies to date have compared task representations in younger and 
older adults. Metacognition research suggests age-related deficits in updating and utilizing 
strategy knowledge, but other research suggests age-related sparing when information can be 
consolidated into a coherent mental model. 
 
Method: Study 1 validated the use of concept mapping as a tool for measuring task 
representation accuracy. Study 2 measured task representations before and after a complex 
strategic task to test for age-related decrements in task representation formation and updating. 
 
Results: Task representation accuracy and task performance were equivalent across age groups. 
Better task representations were related to better performance. However, task representation 
scores remained fairly stable over the task with minimal evidence of updating. 
 
Discussion: Our findings mirror those in the mental model literature suggesting age-related 
sparing of strategy use when information can be integrated into a coherent mental model. Future 
research should manipulate the presence of a unifying context to better evaluate this hypothesis. 
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Article: 
 
Imagine you are playing a new strategy game. How will you do? Will you perform better the 
second time you play the game? You probably expect to do better the second time because you 
will have a better sense of how the game works and what strategies are effective. That is, you 
expect to have a better understanding of the rules, structure, goals, and mechanics of the task—a 
better task representation. Imagine that you were playing this game with your parents or 
grandparents. How will they do? If you are uncertain how aging would affect the ability to form, 
utilize, and update task representations, then you are not alone. Little research has focused on the 
role of aging and task representations on strategic choices. 
 
Older adults often choose less effective strategies compared with younger adults in cognitive 
tasks, potentially contributing to their poorer performance (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Lemaire, 
2010; Price, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2008; Touron & Hertzog, 2004a, 2004b). Whereas younger 
adults adjust their strategies following task experience, older adults are more likely to repeat 
ineffective strategies (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Lemaire, 2010; Price et al., 2008; Touron & 
Hertzog, 2004a, 2004b). Older adults’ continued use of ineffective strategies has been linked to 
inaccurate beliefs (Price et al., 2008), poor confidence (Touron & Hertzog, 2004a,b), and habit 
(Lemaire, 2010). Additionally, it is possible that older adults do not match their strategies to fit 
the task because they have an inaccurate representation, or mental model, of the task itself. 
Models of strategy selection suggest that accurate task representations are critical for effective 
strategy selection (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2009; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Muis, 2007; Winne 
& Hadwin, 1998). For example, when playing the game Scrabble, one can earn additional points 
by creating more than one word, as when using an “s” in their new word to pluralize a word from 
an earlier turn. Models of strategic choice also assume that people identify and correct inaccurate 
task representations and that these corrections lead to more appropriate strategic choices later in 
the task. To our knowledge, no studies to date have directly tested this specific assumption. 
 
The next section briefly describes the role of metacognition in task representation updating and 
research on strategy knowledge updating suggesting that older adults’ ability to update and 
utilize knowledge may be impaired. The subsequent section describes findings from the mental 
model literature suggesting that when information can be represented as a cohesive mental unit, 
older adults demonstrate updating and utilization similar to younger adults. Thus, these 
literatures make opposite predictions regarding aging and task representation updating. Lastly, 
we describe two studies that measure task representation accuracy in younger and older adults to 
test whether aging negatively affects task representation formation, updating, and utilization. 
 
Metacognition and Knowledge Updating 
 
In order to update a faulty task representation, one must monitor the task and compare it with 
one’s own task representation, identifying incongruencies. This process is broadly known as 
metacognitive monitoring (Nelson & Narens, 1990) and is generally spared with age (Dunlosky, 
Baker, Rawson, & Hertzog, 2006; Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, 
& Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010; Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011). That is, 
older adults are typically as accurate as younger adults when monitoring their performance on a 
given trial. However, older adults often struggle to update their knowledge of strategy 
effectiveness or alter their strategic choices—processes known as metacognitive control 
(Dunlosky et al., 2006; Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog, 
Dunlosky, & Sinclair, 2010; Hertzog et al., 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010; Matvey, 
Dunlosky, Shaw, Parks, & Hertzog, 2002). Likewise, in causal learning tasks and probabilistic 
learning tasks—where participants learn to predict an outcome based on a series of cues—older 
adults struggle to learn about negative cue-probability relationships and use fewer cues when 
making predictive judgments (Chasseigne et al., 2004; Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 
2010; Mutter & Asriel, 2016; but see Hines, Hertzog, & Touron, 2015). These results suggest 
that, relative to younger adults, older adults may also struggle to update their task representations 
or may not fully take advantage of accurate task representations (a utilization failure). 
 
Aging and Mental Models 
 
In contrast to older adults’ struggles to update and utilize knowledge about strategies, older 
adults often demonstrate age-related sparing when information can be represented as a coherent 
mental model (Castel, 2007; Gilbert, Rogers, & Samuelson, 2004; Morrow, Leirer, Altieri, & 
Fitzsimmons, 1994a; Radvansky, 1999b; Radvansky, Copeland, Berish, & Dijkstra, 
2003; Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007; Radvansky, Gerard, Zacks, & Hasher, 1990; Radvansky, 
Zacks, & Hasher, 1996; Stine-Morrow, Gagne, Morrow, & DeWall, 2004; Stine-Morrow, 
Morrow, & Leno, 2002). For example, older adults are as adept as younger adults at updating the 
motives and locations of characters in a narrative (Gilbert et al., 2004; Morrow et al., 
1994a; Radvansky, 1999b; Radvansky et al., 2003; Stine-Morrow et al., 2004, 2002). Older 
adults also demonstrate superior memory when information can be consolidated into a single 
mental model. For example, when given a list of objects, each in a different location, older adults 
perform poorly at recalling the individual objects (Radvansky et al., 1996). However, when 
given a list of objects located in a single location—which allows for a single integrated mental 
model—age differences in object memory are reduced. Thus, the mental model literature 
suggests that if older adults organize their task representations into cohesive units, they should 
show age-related sparing in mental model formation, updating, and utilization. 
 
We used a concept mapping technique to measure task representation accuracy in younger and 
older adults. Concept mapping has been used extensively to measure young adults’ mental 
models in domains ranging from accounting (Curtis & Davis, 2003), to radar warning systems 
(Rowe & Cooke, 1995), to negotiations (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). However, no studies 
to our knowledge have used concept mapping to measure older adults’ mental models. Thus, 
Study 1 tested whether concept mapping can measure older adults’ task representations. Study 2 
tested whether task representations and task representation updating influence performance on a 
strategic choice task—a claim prevalent in models of strategic choice. Additionally, Study 2 
tested whether older adults struggle to form, update, and utilize task representations—as 
suggested by studies of knowledge updating—or whether they show age-related sparing—as 
suggested by studies of mental models. 
 
Study 1 
 
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish that concept mapping techniques could provide an 
accurate measure of task representation in younger and older adults. To minimize the influence 
of prior knowledge and beliefs on task representation formation, we created a novel chemistry 
task with a well-defined structure (analogous to managing swimming pool chemistry). To avoid 
the possibility of floor performance in older adults, we used guided learning quizzes and a 
cumulative criterion test during the task instructions. Although the criterion test required a 
minimum level of “declarative knowledge,” previous studies show declarative knowledge is 
necessary but not sufficient for developing a coherent mental model (Goldsmith, Johnson, & 
Acton, 1991; Novak, 1990; Novak & Cañas, 2006; Staggers & Norico, 1993). Thus, variability 
in task representations was expected despite this learning criterion. 
 
Critically, Study 1 used an inference test (e.g., Goldsmith et al., 1991; Novak, 1990; Novak & 
Cañas, 2006) to establish whether we could measure task understanding. After establishing the 
validity and viability of our task representation measure we could test whether task 
representations affect performance on the actual chemistry task (Study 2). 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty younger adults (aged 18–22 years) and 28 older adults (aged 61–77 years) participated. 
Younger adults received partial course credit whereas older adults were paid for participation. 
Participants were in relatively good health and none reported having ever suffered a major 
seizure or stroke. All participants had corrected near visual acuity of 20/50 or better. Participant 
demographics can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Study 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Demographic and Performance Variables 
  Young  Old  
Age difference  
d  
Demographics        
 N  20    28      
 Age  18.81  (1.81)  69.49  (4.32)    
 Education  12.51  (0.86)  15.49  (2.48)  +1.61**  
 Medications  0.57  (0.90)  2.51  (1.64)  +1.47**  
 Processing speed  38.62  (7.81)  27.80  (4.89)  −1.66**  
 Vocabulary  13.45  (3.12)  22.75  (7.26)  +1.66**  
Performance        
 Cumulative test  0.85  (0.13)  0.75  (0.11)  −0.83**  
 C-score  0.26  (0.09)  0.29  (0.09)  +0.33  
 Attempts to criterion  1.67  (0.91)  2.05  (0.94)  +0.41  
 Inference test  0.59  (0.16)  0.56  (0.17)  −0.18  
Notes: Young = young adult means; Old = older adult means; Processing speed = number correct on out of 30 on the 
Salthouse pattern comparison task (1993); Vocabulary = number correct out of 36 on the Advanced Vocabulary Test 
(Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976); Cumulative test = proportion correct on a 15-question, 9-choice, multiple 
choice cumulative instructions test measuring declarative knowledge of the instructions; C-score = proportion of 
concept map overlap between the participant and reference models ranging from 0 (no overlap) to 1 (perfect 
overlap); Attempts to reach criterion = number of attempts taken to pass the cumulative instructions test; Inference 
test = proportion correct on a 19-question, 4-choice, multiple choice test inference test measuring the ability to apply 
the information from the instructions. Values in parentheses indicate standard deviations. Age difference d = 
Cohen’s d for age comparisons. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Materials and procedures 
 
The study uses a novel chemistry task with a structure analogous to the daily management of 
swimming pool temperature, chlorine, pH, and alkalinity. However, the task is disguised as 
maintaining a chemical solution in a beaker. Terms normally associated with a swimming pool 
are replaced by lettered names (e.g., Chemical C; Property Q) except for temperature and the 
pool heater (the latter was renamed the Bunsen burner). The swimming pool task was chosen 
because properties interact with each other with varying complexity. All materials were 
programmed in E-Prime 2 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) unless otherwise stated. 
 
Demographics 
 
Participants first completed a demographics questionnaire, a near visual acuity test, pattern 
comparison test, and a vocabulary test (Table 1). 
 
Novel chemistry task instructions 
 
Participants next read the instructions for the chemistry task (see Supplementary Material). The 
instructions detailed how each chemical additive affects each chemical property and how the 
chemical properties interact. To aid learning, six computerized guided learning quizzes were 
inserted throughout the instructions, each containing one to three items. These quizzes were 
“open book,” as participants were free to switch between the quiz screens and the instruction 
screens (see Supplementary Material). For incorrect responses, participants were asked to scan 
the instructions for the correct answers. Importantly, the instructions framed the task as 
managing a chemical solution in a beaker and never mentioned that it was analogous to 
managing a swimming pool. 
 
After obtaining 100% accuracy on a quiz, the participant continued to the next section of the 
instructions. There were 15 questions, 7 relating to the properties analogous to chlorine and 8 
relating to the properties analogous to pH/alkalinity. 
 
Cumulative instructions test 
 
After passing all mini-quizzes the participant completed a cumulative instructions test containing 
the same 15 items from the mini-quizzes (presented in the same order), without referencing the 
instructions. To pass this test, a participant had to correctly answer at minimum four of the seven 
“chlorine questions” and four of the eight “pH/alkalinity questions.” Participants who did not 
meet this criterion were returned to the start of the learning phase and asked to restudy the 
instructions and their quiz answers. (Initial piloting did not include the mini-quizzes and included 
minimal feedback on criterion test performance. Under these initial conditions most participants 
did not reach the criterion and all voiced considerable frustration with the task. Adding the mini-
quizzes and increasing the degree of feedback improved criterion test performance, eliminated 
complaints of frustration, and improved compliance.) 
 
Task representations 
 
To measure overall task representation accuracy, we used a pathfinder-derived concept mapping 
technique (Goldsmith, Johnson, & Acton, 1991). A concept map includes nodes (concepts) 
connected by links representing the relationships among concepts (Novak & Cañas, 
2006; Novak, 1990). For example, in Figure 1, “Bunsen burner,” “temperature,” and “bacteria” 
are nodes, whereas the arrows indicate links. This technique provides pairs of concepts and the 
participant rates how related they are, repeating this procedure for all possible pairs (Goldsmith 
et al., 1991). The ratings are then subjected to a pathfinder algorithm that transforms the matrix 
of ratings into a concept map by removing indirect relationships between nodes whenever there 
is a stronger more direct relationship (see Johnson, Goldsmith, & Teague, 1994 for a detailed 
description). 
 
 
Figure 1. Study 2 reference map. Bubbles represent concepts (nodes) and links represent the 
relationships between nodes. Dotted light gray arrows indicate categorical relationships (i.e., 
Chemical C is a Chemical agent). Light gray arrows accompanied by plus (+) signs indicate 
positive relationships (i.e., Chemical C increases Property Q). Black arrows accompanied by 
minus (−) signs indicate negative relationships (i.e., Chemical N decreases Property Q). The 
dotted black arrow between Inactive D and Active D indicates that Inactive D is used up Active 
D. 
 
The proportion of overlap between a participant’s concept map and the reference map (correct 
concept map) is referred to as a “closeness” or “C-score” (Johnson et al., 1994). C-scores are 
computed as the number of shared links between a participant’s concept map and the reference 
map, divided by the total number of links in both maps combined. Thus, C-scores range from 0 
(no overlap) to 1 (identical concept maps; Goldsmith et al., 1991). C-scores from relevant 
concept maps predict performance in various domains, including accounting (Curtis & Davis, 
2003), teaching of elementary mathematics (Gomez, Hadfield, & Housner, 1996), ACT math 
scores (Johnson et al., 1994), radar warning systems troubleshooting (Rowe & Cooke, 1995), and 
negotiations (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). We also computed raw correlations between the 
participant’s and an expert’s pathfinder ratings and analyzed those raw correlations in place of C-
scores. The results were virtually identical to those reported using C-scores. 
 
We used Rate software (Interlink, 1990) to present 19 relevant terms (see Supplementary 
Material). Participants rated each possible pair of terms (presented in random order) from 1 
(unrelated) to 9 (related). 
 
Inference test 
 
Participants then completed an inference test containing 22 multiple choice questions 
(see Supplementary Material). This test presented situations involving the chemistry task and 
asked the participants to indicate either what caused the situation or what they should do to 
correct it. Participants did not perform the actual chemistry task in Study 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between C-scores and performance. Top panel: Study 1 relationship 
between C-scores and inference test scores (percent correct). Bottom panel: Study 2 relationship 
between C-scores and chemistry task performance. 
 
Posttask measures 
 
Participants next made a series of 1–5 ratings regarding their task experience (see Supplementary 
Material) and indicated any terms they felt were omitted from the ratings task 
(see Supplementary Material). (no participant suggested any additional terms for the ratings 
task). Additionally participants were asked, “What did this task make you think of?” and “Have 
you ever owned or managed a swimming pool before?” No participants indicated that the task 
reminded them of managing a swimming pool. (Participants having owned or managed a 
swimming pool did not perform differently on any measure relative to those not having owned or 
managed a pool.) 
 
Results 
 
Neither C-scores, nor inference test scores, differed with age (Table 1; Figure 2). These measures 
were positively correlated overall, r(48) = .58, p = .001, and within younger, r(19) = .50, and 
older adults, r(27) = .67, (Figure 2, top panel), supporting the validity of the pathfinder technique 
for measuring task representations in both samples. 
 
Discussion 
 
Despite the required level of declarative knowledge, participants’ task representation C-scores 
and inference test scores showed considerable variance. Higher C-scores were associated with 
higher test performance. This is consistent with the claim that the underlying structure of 
knowledge and the interrelations among ideas are more critical for knowledge utilization than is 
declarative knowledge (Curtis & Davis, 2003). These findings also validate the use of 
pathfinder-derived concept maps to measure task representations. Most importantly these results 
held for both age groups, validating concept mapping as a viable measure of task representations 
in older adults. These results provide the foundation for Study 2 which tested the impact of task 
representation formation, updating, and utilization on younger and older adults’ performance. 
 
Study 2 
 
Study 2 measured task representations before and after completing the novel chemistry task (as 
opposed to the inference test in Study 1) to test whether: (i) initial task representations influence 
performance in younger and older adults, (ii) older adults struggle to update task representations, 
and (iii) differences in task representation updating account for differences in performance 
improvements on the chemistry task. We also changed the instructions (see Methods section) to 
ensure that participants began the task with incomplete task representations that could be 
updated. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty-five younger adults (aged 18–25 years) and 30 older adults (aged 60–75 years) 
participated. An additional eight older adults participated but were unable to complete the 
experiment in 3 hours. Participant compensation and characteristics were as described for Study 
1; demographics can be found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Study 2 Demographic and Performance Data 
  Young  Old  
Age difference  
d  
Demographics        
 N  35    30      
 Age  18.54  (0.85)  70.90  (3.35)    
 Education  12.40  (0.69)  16.45  (1.82)  +2.94**  
 Medications  0.54  (0.82)  2.13  (1.98)  +1.05**  
 Processing speed  38.89  (7.46)  27.76  (5.34)  −1.72**  
 Vocabulary  15.60  (4.36)  24.70  (6.01)  +1.73**  
Performance        
 Cumulative test 1  0.42  (0.25)  0.47  (0.23)  +0.21  
 C-score 1  0.25  (0.09)  0.30  (0.12)  +0.47  
 Chemistry task  −2.59  (25.88)  3.01  (20.69)  +0.23  
 C-score 2  0.25  (0.12)  0.29  (0.07)  +0.41  
 Cumulative test 2  0.45  (0.31)  0.42  (0.25)  −0.11  
Notes: Processing speed = number correct on out of 60 on Salthouse’s Pattern Comparison task (1993); Vocabulary 
= number correct out of 36 on the Advanced Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976); Cumulative test 1 = proportion 
correct on a 15-question, 9-choice, multiple choice, pretask cumulative instructions test measuring declarative 
knowledge of the instructions; C-score 1 = pretask proportion of concept map overlap between the participant and 
reference models ranging from 0 (no overlap) to 1 (perfect overlap); Chemistry task = Performance on the chemistry 
task, positive scores indicate above average performance, negative scores indicate below average performance. C-
score 2 = posttask proportion of concept map overlap; Cumulative test 2 = proportion correct on a 15-question, 9-
choice, multiple choice, posttask cumulative instructions test measuring declarative knowledge of the instructions. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Materials and procedures 
 
Participants completed the same pretests used in Study 1. (As in Study 1, participants having 
owned or managed a swimming pool did not perform differently on any measure relative to those 
not having owned or managed a pool.) Participants then completed the chemistry task 
instructions, ratings tasks, novel chemistry task, ratings task a second time, and posttask 
measures. 
 
Novel chemistry task instructions 
 
Pilot studies revealed that, unlike the inference test used in Study 1, younger adults performed at 
ceiling when performing the actual chemistry task. As a result, several changes were made to the 
instructions (for both age groups). The novel chemistry task instructions were presented without 
the guided learning quizzes. The cumulative instructions test was retained, but the criterion was 
eliminated and three items deemed peripheral to the task were removed (e.g., whether a property 
being too high caused corrosion or toxic fumes). To ensure that participants entered the novel 
chemistry task with imperfect task representations, we removed information regarding which 
chemical properties were affected by temperature and how chemicals C, T, and N impact 
Properties B and Q. Participants were informed that the information was incomplete and told to 
learn these relationships during the task. 
 
Pretask pathfinder ratings 
 
Participants next completed pathfinder ratings to measure their task representations following 
instructions. As with the cumulative instructions test, we removed items from the pathfinder 
ratings task that were not directly relevant to the chemistry task (see Supplementary Material). 
Participants were offered a break halfway through the ratings task. 
 
Novel chemistry task 
 
The novel chemistry task was programmed in E-Prime 2 (Schneider et al., 2002) and featured 
five chemical solution properties to be maintained within an ideal range (Figure 3). When 
properties fell outside the ideal range, the effects on the solution became more robust. Task trials 
were presented as a series of “days.” For each day, a report indicated the current level of each 
property and the ideal range for each property. The participant could then add doses of chemicals 
or adjust the setting of the Bunsen burner. The goal of the task was to keep each solution 
property as close as possible to the center of its ideal range. After 7 days, a new trial began with 
a new chemical solution. Each solution had a different starting state, meaning different properties 
were outside the ideal ranges. Poor strategic choices (i.e., adding the wrong chemicals) could 
create further problems, whereas proper choices would eliminate problems and bring properties 
into their ideal ranges. However, even with ideal adjustments, some problems required multiple 
days to correct. Eighteen different problem starting states each occurred (randomly) once during 
the first half and once during the second half of the task. 
 
 
Figure 3. Chemistry task interface. The actual task was presented in color rather than grayscale. 
 
Scoring 
 
To control for inherent differences in starting state difficulty, scores for each solution were mean 
centered. Positive scores indicate above average performance (property values were closer to the 
midpoint) and negative scores indicate below average performance (property values were farther 
from the midpoint; see Supplementary Material). These scores were not visible to the 
participants. Instead they had to deduce the effectiveness of their strategic decisions based on 
whether the properties returned to their ideal ranges. 
 
Posttask pathfinder rating and questionnaire 
 
After the chemistry task, participants completed the ratings task again to assess changes in task 
representations. Finally, participants completed the instructions quiz again and the same posttask 
survey described in Study 1. (When asked to list any terms that they felt should have been 
included in the ratings task, one younger and one older adult listed link labels (verbs)—which are 
not typically used in pathfinder-derived concept maps. No other participants indicated that any 
terms were missing.) 
 
Results 
 
Task representations 
 
We examined age differences in task representation formation and updating via a 2 (Age: young, 
old) × 2 (Time: pretask, posttask) analysis of variance. There was a trend toward younger adults 
entering the task with more accurate task representations, F(1, 63) = 3.57, p = .063. Neither age 
group demonstrated task representation updating, no main effect of time or Age × Time 
interaction, Fs < 1. Most participants showed only small positive or negative changes in C-scores 
(changes between −.1 and .1). As in Study 1, initial C-scores correlated strongly with 
performance r(63) = .54, p < .001, in both younger r(32) = .54 and older adults r(28) = .56 
(Figure 2, bottom panel). 
 
Novel task performance 
 
We analyzed chemistry task scores using three hierarchical linear models (SAS Proc 
MIXED; Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 2000). Model 1 tested for age differences in 
overall performance and performance changes with practice. Model 2 tested whether initial task 
representations predict task performance above and beyond age and practice. Model 3 tested 
whether “changes” in task representations predict changes in performance over trials. For each 
model, younger adults served as the reference group (young = 0; old = 1), and trials were entered 
0–35 so the intercept indicates average young adult performance on Trial 1. 
 
Model 1: Changes in performance with practice 
The first model testing age differences in overall performance and changes with practice (Table 
3) included age, trial, and the Age × Trial interaction. The main effect of trial indicates that 
participants’ performance on the chemistry task improved with practice. However, the null 
effects for age and the Age × Trial interaction suggest that younger and older adults performed 
similarly overall and improved similarly across trials (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Table 3. Model Results for Chemistry Task Performance 
  Estimate  SE  df  t Value  p Value  
Model 1            
 Intercept  −5.65  1.80  63  −3.14  .003  
 Age 2.53  2.64  63  0.96  .343  
 Trial  0.17  0.09  2,273  1.98  .048  
 Age × Trial  0.18  0.13  2,273  1.35  .176  
Model 2  
 Intercept  −45.49  2.95  63  −15.44  <.001  
 Age  12.58  4.20  63  2.99  .004  
 Initial C-score  157.66  9.65  2,271  16.33  <.001  
 Trial  0.17  0.08  2,271  2.15  .032  
 Age × Initial C-score  −59.33  12.50  2,271  −4.75  <.001  
 Age × Trial  0.18  0.12  2,271  1.47  .141  
Model 3  
 Intercept  −50.07  2.90  63  −17.26  <.001  
 Age  13.75  4.86  63  2.83  .006  
 Initial C-score  178.71  9.59  2,267  18.64  <.001  
 C-score change  100.54  17.18  2,267  5.85  <.001  
 Trial  0.17  0.08  2,267  2.20  .028  
 Age × Initial C-score  −68.70  15.23  2,267  −4.51  <.001  
 Age × C-score change  −86.11  27.62  2,267  −3.12  .002  
 Age × Trial  0.18  0.12  2,267  1.53  .127  
 C-score change × Trial  −0.06  0.84  2,267  −0.07  .943  
 Age × Trial × C-score change  0.32  1.24  2,267  0.26  .798  
Notes: Models of chemistry task performance. Performance scores are corrected for trial difficulty. Performance 
scores of zero indicate average performance, with positive values being above average and negative values being 
below average. Younger adults serve as the reference group. Thus positive age effects indicate better performance or 
steeper slopes for older adults relative to young. Main effects indicate the beta estimate for young adults with the 
interaction coefficient indicating how beta estimate changes for older adults. 
 
 
Figure 4. Study 2 Chemistry task performance over trials, by age group. Data are averaged over 
bins of three trials for visual purposes, but unbinned data were analyzed. Analyses of binned data 
produced the same pattern of results as the unbinned analyses. 
 
Model 2: Performance as a function of initial task representation 
 
To determine whether task representations influence performance, Model 2 added initial 
(pretask) C-scores and the interaction with age as predictors of chemistry task performance. The 
main effect of pretask C-scores confirmed that more accurate initial task representations 
produced better performance (Figure 2). When including pretask C-scores in the model, we 
obtained a significant age effect, with older adults outperforming younger adults when C-scores 
were held constant. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant Age × Initial C-
score interaction, with a steeper slope for the initial C-score–performance relationship for 
younger adults than for older adults. The main effect of trial continued to be significant, and the 
Age × Trial interaction remained nonsignificant. 
 
Although the main effect of age indicates higher performance in older adults, this is undermined 
by the Age × Initial C-score interaction. Older adults’ shallower slope for initial C-scores results 
in higher performance estimates (relative to younger adults) when task representations are poor 
(initial C-score of 0.15; see Figure 2), but lower performance estimates (relative to younger 
adults) when task representations are even moderately accurate (initial C score = .30). In 
summary, accurate task representations are related to superior performance for both age groups. 
However, younger adults with accurate task representations may be better at utilizing them. 
 
Model 3: Changes in performance as a function of task representation updating 
 
Although C-scores changed little following practice, a few participants showed moderate 
positive or negative changes. If these changes in C-scores reflect accurate updating and 
forgetting/confusion respectively, this might be reflected in performance. Thus changes in C-
scores and the interactions of C-score change, trial, and age were added to the model. 
 
The main effects of initial C-scores and the Age × Initial C-score interaction remained 
significant, with higher initial C-scores predicting better overall task performance, and a steeper 
relationship for younger adults. The significant positive main effect of C-score change was 
qualified by a significant negative Age × C-score change interaction. This main effect indicates 
that improvements in C-scores from pre- to posttask were associated with higher overall 
performance. However, the coefficient for the age interaction indicates that, unlike younger 
adults, older adults showed only modest performance gains when C-scores improved. 
 
C-scores are thought to reflect “structural” relationships between concepts. If structural changes 
to task representations are primarily responsible for improvements on the chemistry task, then 
the C-score change × Trial interaction should be significant, with greater improvements in 
performance for participants who corrected their task representations. However, this was not the 
case. The main effect of trial remained significant after accounting for C-score change. 
Additionally, the Change × Trial, and Age × Change × Trial interactions were not significant, 
indicating that the changes in task performance over trials seen in Model 1 are not reflected in 
changes in C-scores. 
 
However, if changes in task representations are infrequent and occur at different points in the 
task for different participants, then a single linear coefficient may not describe the relationship 
between changes in task representations and trial-by-trial improvements. Instead, improvements 
resulting from task representation updating would be better fit by a main effect on performance 
which is germane to the specific time point during which updating occurs. This is precisely the 
pattern that we obtained. 
 
Discussion 
 
Older adults formed task representations equivalent to those of younger adults. This occurred 
despite removing the guided learning quizzes and cumulative test criterion. Likewise, older 
adults performed similar to younger adults on the novel chemistry task and similarly improved 
their performance. These results are consistent with studies suggesting age-related sparing in 
performance when information can be organized into a coherent mental model (Castel, 
2007; Gilbert et al., 2004; Morrow, Leirer, Altieri, & Fitzsimmons, 1994b; Radvansky et al., 
2003, 1990; Radvansky & Dijkstra, 2007; Radvansky, 1999a; Stine-Morrow et al., 2004, 2002). 
It is important to note that eight older adults were unable to complete Study 2 within the allotted 
time. Thus, the age-related sparing in our task may, in part, be a by-product of the poorest 
performing older adults being unable to complete the study. However, older adults who did not 
complete the task were somewhat slower, but otherwise similar to the older adults who did 
complete the task. (The eight older adults who did not complete the study were of similar age (M 
= 70.1), t(36) = 0.58, p = .568 and had similar vocabulary scores (M = 22.4), t(36) = 1.16, p = 
.254, and years of education (M = 15.6), t(36) = 0.99, p = .331, as the older adults who did 
complete the study (Table 2). They were marginally slower on pattern comparison (M = 
23.8), t(36) = 2.01, p = .052. Of the older adults who did not complete the task, the slowest 
performed only 10 trials. As a group, the nonfinishers performed numerically (M = −6.51), but 
not significantly worse than their finishing older adult counterparts (M = −0.89), t(36) = 0.73, p = 
.468, over the first 10 trials.) 
 
Initial task representations were predictive of chemistry task performance for both age groups, 
supporting models of strategic choice (Bromme et al., 2009; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Muis, 
2007; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). However, young adults with accurate task representations 
generally outperformed older adults with similar task representations. Thus the evidence suggests 
a mental model utilization deficiency in older adults. This finding fits with age-related 
impairments in metacognitive control (Dunlosky et al., 2006; Dunlosky & Connor, 
1997; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog, Dunlosky, et al., 2010; Hertzog et al., 2002, Hertzog, 
Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010). However, in our study these impairments were relatively small. 
 
Although both age groups showed modest improvement in performance throughout the 
chemistry task, task representation updating (as measured by changes in C-scores) was rare in 
both age groups. This is not entirely surprising given findings that even younger adults do not 
fully update their strategy knowledge following task experience (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 
2000; Hertzog et al., 2009; 2008; Hertzog, Price, & Dunlosky, 2012). Knowledge updating may 
have been additionally impaired if participants failed to understand or utilize the feedback 
provided during the chemistry task (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2015). It is also possible that 
improvements in task performance resulted primarily from learning how much of a chemical to 
add rather than learning new relationships between the chemical additives and the properties they 
affect. Pathfinder ratings capture only the presence or absence of relationships and not their 
degree or direction. An alternative would be to use a rolling regression technique that regresses 
the specific levels of each cue (solution property value) onto the strategic choices of the 
participant (decision to add a particular chemical; see Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 
2006 for an explanation). This technique estimates how each participant weighs the different 
cues throughout the task. Unfortunately rolling regression is not possible with the current data set 
because the cues have nonlinear and interactive relationships with each other and with other 
decisions on each trial. Given the complexity of the relationships within our task, and older 
adults documented struggles with learning new directional relationships (Chasseigne et al., 
2004; Mata et al., 2010), it is all the more impressive that older adults obtained similar 
performance as that of younger adults. However, this performance equivalence should not be 
confused with strategy equivalence. Performance on the chemistry task is reflective of the 
appropriateness of the strategic choices. However, it does not indicate how participants improved 
their performance. Younger and older adults might have differed in whether they improved their 
performance through learning new relationships, fine-tuning relationships learned during the 
instructions phase, or considering multiple cues together rather than separately (which would not 
necessarily require new learning). 
 
Despite the general lack of updating, when subtle improvements in task representations did 
occur, they were related to better task performance, supporting models of strategic choice 
(Bromme et al., 2009; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Muis, 2007; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Notably, 
older adults benefitted somewhat less compared with younger adults when they improved their 
task representations. This apparent inability to fully utilize their updated task representations 
indicates an age-related decrement in cognitive control and is somewhat consistent with both the 
metacognitive (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog et al., 2009, 2008, 2012) and probabilistic 
learning literatures (Chasseigne et al., 2004; Mata et al., 2010) where older adults struggle to 
learn and utilize complex relationships via monitoring and feedback. However, in the current 
studies, older adults’ overall performance was still generally similar, if not superior to, that of 
younger adults. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Task representations are thought to guide strategic choices on a variety of tasks (Bromme et al., 
2009; Lovett & Schunn, 1999; Muis, 2007; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Despite known age 
differences in strategic choices, no previous study to our knowledge has examined age 
differences in task representations. Study 1 demonstrated that pathfinder-derived concept maps 
(C-scores) can be used to measure younger and older adults’ task representations. Study 2 found 
a strong relationship between C-scores and performance on a novel chemistry task. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual differences in task representation 
accuracy produce individual differences in performance (Bromme et al., 2009; Lovett & Schunn, 
1999; Muis, 2007; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). 
 
Neither study found significant age-related decrements in task representation formation. Because 
mental model formation is cognitively demanding (Schnotz & Preuss, 1997), it is important to 
consider why older adults are able to form accurate mental representations in our studies and 
others (e.g., Castel, 2007; Radvansky et al., 2003, 1990; Stine-Morrow et al., 2004, 2002). The 
self-paced nature of our and many other studies (but see Castel, 2007) may allow older adults to 
compensate for age-related declines by taking more time to learn and make decisions. 
Alternatively, older adults may have benefitted from their prior knowledge and schemas by 
incorporating the new task information into them. This seems unlikely given the novelty of the 
chemistry task, however older adults’ vocabulary scores (a rough proxy for crystalized 
knowledge) correlated with chemistry task performance, r = .41. 
 
Age differences in performance were also minimal. If anything, older adults performed slightly 
better than younger adults. This finding is consistent with research showing that older adults 
perform better when information can be incorporated into a coherent mental representation (e.g., 
Castle, 2007; Radvansky et al., 2003, 1990; Stine-Morrow et al., 2004, 2002). To more directly 
test this hypothesis, future research should manipulate whether the task relationships are 
provided with or without a unifying context (i.e., the chemistry task narrative). Additionally, 
future studies should include other measures for identifying task misrepresentations, such as 
critical error analysis (Harada, Mori, & Taniue, 2010) or strategic step skipping (Haider & 
Frensch, 1996; Kieras & Bovair, 1983). 
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